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Abstract: 
In this paper, we analyse the effect of unionisation on the growth of the economy in the presence of 
‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’. We use both ‘Efficient Bargaining’ model and ‘Right to Manage’ model 
to solve the negotiation problem. Unionisation raises negotiated wage rate and the effort (efficiency) 
level of the worker. In the case of ‘efficient bargaining model’, unionisation reduces the negotiated 
number of workers but improves the effort level when the union is neutral in its orientation. As a result, 
effective employment is increased; and this leads to a rise in the growth rate and welfare level of the 
economy. However, in the ‘Right to manage model’ of bargaining, unionisation in the labour market 
raises the effort level of worker but lowers the number of workers irrespective of the orientation of the 
labour union; and raises effective employment, balanced growth rate and welfare level if the wage 
elasticity of efficiency is greater than the unemployment rate.  
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1. Introduction: 
 Unionisation exists in labour markets of almost every country with a varying degree. 
Though some works1 show that labour unions have become weaker over time in some countries 
like United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan etc., they still play a crucial role to determine 
wage rate and employment in many other countries, for example in European countries2. In 
recent years, many European countries are suffering from high unemployment rate as well as 
from low growth rate; and there is a view that reducing labour market frictions are necessary 
to promote economic growth. So it is important to make a theoretical analysis of the effect of 
unionisation on economic growth.  
 There already exists a set of literature3 dealing with the effect of unionisation on the 
long run growth rate of the economy. However, these works mainly emphasise on the effects 
of unionisation on wage, intersectoral labour allocation and unemployment and thereby on 
economic growth but does not focus on the role of ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’4,5. Since 
unionisation raises wage rate of employed workers, so, according to ‘Efficiency Wage 
Hypothesis’, effort (efficiency) level per worker rises6; and this may cause an overall positive 
effect on the production level. A few works have focused on the role of efficiency wage on 
union firm bargaining7. However, no one has analysed the effect of unionisation on economic 
growth in the presence of ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’.   
 The present paper attempts to develop a model to analyse effects of unionisation in the 
labour market on the employment level, growth rate and welfare level of an economy in the 
presence of ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’. The model developed here is an AK model with an 
unionised labour market and with an unemployment benefit scheme. In this model, we use two 
alternative versions of bargaining models – the ‘Efficient Bargaining Model’ of McDonald and 
Solow (1981) and the ‘Right to Manage Model’ of Nickell and Andrews (1983).  
1 See for example Freeman and Ichniowski (1988), Dinardo et al. (1996) and Visser (2006).   
2 See for example Page 6 of Lingens (2004).  
3 See, for example, Bräuninger (2000), Lingens (2003a, 2003b), Irmen and Wigger (2002/2003), Sorensen (1997), 
Palokangas (1996, 2004), Chang et al. (2007), Adjemian et al. (2010), Lai and Wang (2010), Ramos-Parreño and 
Sánchez-Losada (2002) etc.  
4 See, for example, Solow (1979), Yellen (1984), Stiglitz (1976), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Akerlof (1982, 
1984), Akerlof and Yellen (1986) etc. for a discussion on efficiency wage hypothesis.    
5 An earlier version of Palokangas (2004), i.e., Palokangas (2003) incorporates ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’ in 
his model, but does not emphasis on its role while determining the effect of unionisation. In fact, in a footnote in 
that paper, he states that “However, the results in this paper hold even if the effort per worker is wholly 
inflexible……”. The published version of the paper, i.e., Palokangas (2004) does not incorporate ‘Efficiency Wage 
Hypothesis’.  
6 See sections 9.2 and 9.3 of Romer (2006).  
7 See, for example, Garino and Martin (2000), Marti (1997), Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2003), Pereau and Sanz 
(2006) etc.  
                                                            
 We derive interesting results from this model. In the ‘Efficient Bargaining model’, 
unionisation in the labour market reduces the negotiated number of workers but raises the effort 
(efficiency) level per worker when the labour union is neutral in its orientation, i.e., when it is 
neither wage oriented nor membership oriented. Effective employment measured in efficiency 
unit is increased; and this leads to a rise in the growth rate and welfare level of the economy. 
However, in the ‘Right to Manage Model’, unionisation in the labour market raises the effort 
level per worker but lowers the number of workers irrespective of the orientation of the labour 
union; and raises effective employment, balanced growth rate and welfare level if and only if 
the wage elasticity of effort is greater than the unemployment rate. This sufficient condition is 
valid when the income tax rate charged by the government to finance unemployment benefit 
expenditure is very low.   
 The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2, we describe the basic model 
and analyse the effect of unionisation with ‘Efficient Bargaining’. In section 3, we do the same 
with a ‘Right to Manage’ model. Section 4 concludes.   
2. The model: 
2.1 Firms: 
The representative competitive firm produces the final good, Y, using private capital, 
K, and effective labour, eL; and its production function8 is given by            𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼                                                                                                                    (1) 
satisfying  𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽,𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ∈ (0,1)  .            
Here A > 0 is a time independent technology parameter. 𝐾𝐾� represents average amount of capital 
stock of all firms available in the economy; and 0 < α < 1 ensures that external effect of capital 
is positive. Here L denotes the number of workers and e represents the work effort given by 
each worker.9 Existence of decreasing returns to private inputs leads to super normal profit in 
equilibrium; and this acts as the rent in the bargaining process to be negotiated between the 
employers’ association and the labour union. Following Chang et al. (2007), we assume that a 
8 This production function is identical to that in Chang et al. (2007) except for the fact that Chang et al. (2007) 
does not consider effort of workers, e.  
9 We assume that all workers have identical effort levels.  
                                                            
fixed quantity of land is necessary for a firm to operate; and thus the number of firms is fixed 
even in the presence of positive profit due to fixed availability of land.10  
 We introduce the efficiency wage hypothesis11 which states that the effort level of a 
worker, e, varies positively with the premium of wage over his alternative reservation income. 
For simplicity, we assume that a worker's reservation income is the unemployment benefit per 
unemployed worker, b. So the worker’s effort function is given by 12   
          𝑒𝑒 = ℎ �𝑤𝑤
𝑏𝑏
�
𝛿𝛿         .                                                                                                                           (2) 
Here h is a positive parameter and it denotes worker’s effort level when effort level is 
independent of wage premium, i.e. when δ  = 0. Here 𝛿𝛿 represents the elasticity of effort with 
respect to the wage rate; and it is assumed to be a positive constant satisfying 0 < δ  < 1. Chang 
et al. (2007) does not consider efficiency wage hypothesis. In Chang et al. (2007), 𝑒𝑒 ≡ 1, i.e., 
δ  = 0 and h = 1. 
 The firm maximises profit, 𝜋𝜋, defined as            𝜋𝜋 = 𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾   .                                                                                                                    (3)                                                                
Here w and r represent wage rate and rental rate on private capital respectively.  
 Private capital market is perfectly competitive. The equilibrium value of rental rate on 
private capital is determined by the supply-demand equality. The demand function for private 
capital is derived from firms’ profit maximization exercise; and it is given by  
          𝑟𝑟 = 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−1(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼 = 𝛼𝛼𝑌𝑌
𝐾𝐾
     .                                                                                           (4) 
 2.2 Government: 
10 Number of firms is normalized to unity. The equilibrium in the product market is always a short run competitive 
equilibrium with positive profit. Lai and Wang (2010) and Chang et al. (2007) also consider that union bargaining 
takes place in competitive production sector. However, Adjemian et al. (2010), Bräuninger (2000) and Lingens 
(2003b) assume a monopolistically competitive sector; and Lingens (2003a) assumes a monopoly product market. 
Ramos-Parreño and Sánchez-Losada (2002) and Irmen and Wigger (2002/2003) consider monopoly labour union 
model.                             
11 See footnote 4. 
12 Danthine and Kurmann (2006) has also used almost similar functional form.  
                                                            
The government finances unemployment benefit scheme by charging an exogenously 
given rate of income tax, τ ; and balances its budget at each point of time. The budget balancing 
equation is given by   
           τ𝑌𝑌 = 𝑏𝑏(1 − 𝑒𝑒)     .                                                                                                                       (5) 
Here (1 − 𝑒𝑒) is the unemployment level.   
2.3 Labour union and Efficient bargaining:  
The labour union in this model derives utility from the hike in the wage rate over the 
unemployment benefit rate13 as well as from the size of membership. All employed workers 
are assumed to be members of the union. The utility function of the labour union is given by            𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇 = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝑏𝑏)𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛       .                                                                                                                (6) 
Here 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇 stands for the utility of the labour union. m and n are elasticities of labour union’s 
utility with respect to wage premium and with respect to number of members respectively. The 
labour union is said to be ‘wage oriented’ (‘employment oriented’) (‘neutral’) if m > (<) (=) n. 
Chang et al. (2007) contains a brief discussion about these parameters. Others works including 
Lingens (2003a, 2003b) and Adjemian et al. (2010) assume m = n = 1, i.e., the labour union to 
be neutral. 
 We now consider the ‘Efficient bargaining model’ where wage rate and number of 
employed workers are determined jointly by the labour union and the employer’s association; 
and they maximize the ‘generalised Nash product’ function given by           𝜓𝜓 = ( 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇 − 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇����)𝜃𝜃(𝜋𝜋 −  𝜋𝜋�)(1−𝜃𝜃)    .                                                                                            (7) 
Here 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇����  and 𝜋𝜋� stand for the reservation utility level of the labour union and the reservation 
profit level of the firm respectively. Bargaining disagreement discontinues production process 
and this implies 𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇���� = 𝜋𝜋� = 0. The relative bargaining power of the labour union is represented 
by 𝜃𝜃 ∈ (0,1). Unionisation is defined as an exogenous increase in the relative bargaining power 
of the labour union, i.e. in the value of 𝜃𝜃.  
13 Irmen and Wigger (2003), Lingens (2003a) and Lai and Wang (2010) assume that the difference between the 
bargained wage rate and the competitive wage rate is an argument in the labour union’s utility function. Contrary 
to this, Adjemian et al. (2010) and Chang et al. (2007) assume that the difference between the after tax bargained 
wage rate and the unemployment benefit is an argument in the labour union’s utility function. So, this paper 
follows the second kind of modelling.  
                                                            
 Finally, using equations (3), (6) and (7), we obtain            𝜓𝜓 = {(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑏𝑏)𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛}𝜃𝜃{𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾}(1−𝜃𝜃)     .                                                                        (8) 
Here 𝜓𝜓 is to be maximised with respect to w and 𝑒𝑒. Using equations (1), (2), (4) and (5), and 
two first order conditions of optimisation, we solve for optimal w and 𝑒𝑒.14 These are given by 
          𝑒𝑒∗ = 𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4
𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4 + τ𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3      ;                                                                                                              (9) 
and 
          𝑤𝑤∗ = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼ℎ𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼(𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4 + τ𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3)𝛽𝛽−1 � 𝛩𝛩2𝛽𝛽𝛩𝛩3𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩41−𝛽𝛽(1−𝛿𝛿)�       .                                                               (10) 
Here,                𝛩𝛩1 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃)  > 0    ,                                                                                                     (11)           𝛩𝛩2 = [𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)]    > 0     ,                                                                              (12)           𝛩𝛩3 = [𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃)]     > 0     ,                                           (13) 
and           𝛩𝛩4 = [𝜃𝜃(𝜃𝜃 −𝑚𝑚)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃)]        .                                        (14) 
We assume 𝛩𝛩4 to be positive to ensure 0 < 𝑒𝑒∗ < 1. This assumption implies that elasticity of 
union’s utility with respect to wage hike, m, cannot be far greater than the corresponding 
elasticity with respect to membership, n. If the union is neutral or employment oriented, i.e., m 
≤ n, then 𝛩𝛩4 is always positive. From equation (9), we obtain  
          𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= − 𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3[𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4 + τ𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3]2 < 0      .                                                                                      (9.𝑎𝑎) 
Equation (9.a) shows that employment level varies inversely with the rate of income tax used 
to finance unemployment benefit. This is so because, a rise in the tax rate raises unemployment 
benefit per worker; and this lowers both the efficiency of a worker and union’s utility from 
wage hike. As a result, wage rate rises and employment level falls.       
14 Derivation of optimal w and L is provided in Appendix A.  
                                                            
Now, from equations (2), (5), (9) and (10), we obtain the effort level per worker as given by15  
          𝑒𝑒∗ = ℎ �𝛩𝛩3
𝛩𝛩4
�
𝛿𝛿       .                                                                                                                      (15) 
From equations (9) and (15), we obtain effective level of employment i.e., the level of 
employment in efficiency unit, as given by  
          𝑒𝑒∗𝑒𝑒∗ = ℎ 𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩41−𝛿𝛿𝛩𝛩3𝛿𝛿
𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4 + 𝜕𝜕𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3          .                                                                                                (16) 
2.4 Households: 
The representative household obtains instantaneous utility only from consumption of 
the final good. She maximises her discounted present value of instantaneous utility over the 
infinite time horizon subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. The household’s problem 
is given by the following.    
         𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀� 𝑐𝑐1−𝜎𝜎 − 11 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌∞
0
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑                                                                                                           (17) 
subject to,      ?̇?𝐾 = (1 − 𝜕𝜕)𝑌𝑌 − 𝑐𝑐                                                                                                       (18)                          𝐾𝐾(0) = 𝐾𝐾0      (𝐾𝐾0 is historically given) 
          and       𝑐𝑐 ∈ [0, (1 − 𝜕𝜕)𝑌𝑌]   .               
Here c denotes consumption level of the representative household; and 𝜎𝜎 and ρ are the two 
parameters representing elasticity of marginal utility of consumption and the rate of discount 
respectively. Savings is always invested and there is no depreciation of private capital. 
Solving this dynamic optimisation problem, we obtain the growth rate of consumption 
as given by  
          𝑔𝑔 = ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
= (1 − 𝜕𝜕)𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼−1(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝛽𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼 − 𝜌𝜌 
𝜎𝜎
        .                                                                 (19) 
  2.5 Equilibrium: 
15 Derivation is provided in Appendix B.  
                                                            
 We assume a symmetric equilibrium where 𝐾𝐾� = 𝐾𝐾, i.e., all firms have equal amount of 
capital; and hence, from equation (19), we obtain a time independent growth rate of 
consumption given by      
          𝑔𝑔 = ?̇?𝑐
𝑐𝑐
= (1 − 𝜕𝜕)𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝛽 − 𝜌𝜌 
𝜎𝜎
        .                                                                                     (20) 
The economy is always in the steady state equilibrium. It does not have transitional dynamic 
properties because this is an AK model. In equilibrium, all variables like number of workers, 
L, income tax rate, 𝜕𝜕, rental rate on capital, r, effort level of worker, e, and effective 
employment, eL, are time-independent. Capital stock, K, final output, Y, negotiated wage rate, 
𝑤𝑤∗, firm’s profit, π, and unemployment benefit, b, grow at the same rate in the steady-state 
equilibrium.  
 2.6 Effect of unionisation: 
From equations (9), (11), (12), (13) and (14), we obtain  
          𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= 𝜕𝜕(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽) �(𝜃𝜃 −𝑚𝑚){𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩2 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛩𝛩3}−𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝛩𝛩12 �[𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4 + 𝜕𝜕𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3]2        .                (21) 
 Equation (21) shows that the effect of unionisation on the employment of workers 
consists of two components. First component is the union’s membership effect. It is ambiguous 
in sign and depends on the nature of orientation of labour union. Second component is the 
substitution effect on employment. An increase in worker’s efficiency lowers the employer’s 
demand for workers. So the second component is negative. We find that employment 
orientation of labour union is necessary but not sufficient condition to have a positive 
relationship between unionisation and the number of workers (members). When labour union 
is wage oriented or even neutral, unionisation must result into a reduction in the number of 
workers (members). In Chang et al. (2007), effect of unionisation on employment solely 
depends on the membership effect and thus on the nature of orientation of the labour union. 
 When the labour union is neutral, i.e., m = n, then    
          𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= −𝜕𝜕(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝛩𝛩12[𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4 + 𝜕𝜕𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3]2 < 0    for    0 < 𝛿𝛿 < 1      .                          (21.𝑎𝑎) 
When the labour union is neutral, employment effect is nil in Chang et al. (2007) because 𝛿𝛿 = 
0 in that model. However, the effect on employment of workers is negative in our model 
because 0 < 𝛿𝛿 < 1.    
 Now, from equations (13), (14) and (15), we obtain   
          𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= 𝛿𝛿ℎ �𝛩𝛩3
𝛩𝛩4
�
𝛿𝛿−1 𝑚𝑚(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)
𝛩𝛩4
2 > 0      .                                                         (22) 
Equation (22) shows that the effort level of a worker varies positively with the degree of 
unionisation in the labour market. Negotiated wage rate rises with the rise in the relative 
bargaining power of the labour union; and this induces the worker to put greater effort. This 
positive relationship between unionisation and effort level is valid only in the presence of 
‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’.    
 Again, from equations (11), (12), (13), (14) and (16), we obtain    
          𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗𝑒𝑒∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= (𝜃𝜃 −𝑚𝑚)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜕𝜕ℎ𝛩𝛩3𝛿𝛿{𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝛩𝛩3(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3}[𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4 + 𝜕𝜕𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3]2𝛩𝛩4𝛿𝛿  
                           + ℎ𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)�𝛩𝛩22𝑚𝑚𝛩𝛩4 + 𝜕𝜕𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)�[𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4 + 𝜕𝜕𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3]2𝛩𝛩31−𝛿𝛿𝛩𝛩4𝛿𝛿       .         (23) 
Equation (23) shows that unionisation affects effective employment through two channels – 
changing the number of workers (members) and changing effort level of workers. The 
membership effect depends partially on the orientation of labour union. However, the other 
effect is originated from the rise in effort level of workers and hence this effect is always 
positive. So employment orientation or neutrality of the labour union is sufficient but not 
necessary to have a positive relationship between effective employment and unionisation in the 
presence of ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’. This implies that, in the presence of ‘Efficiency 
Wage Hypothesis’, unionisation may raise effective employment through a rise in effort even 
if the number of workers (members) is reduced. However, in the absence of this hypothesis, 
i.e., when δ = 0, unionisation does not raise workers’ effort level; and its effect on employment 
(number of workers) depends solely on the orientation of the labour union.  
 When the labour union is neutral, i.e., when m = n, then    
          𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗𝑒𝑒∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= ℎ𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑚𝑚�𝛩𝛩22𝛩𝛩4 + 𝜕𝜕𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)�[𝛩𝛩2𝛩𝛩4 + 𝜕𝜕𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩3]2𝛩𝛩31−𝛿𝛿𝛩𝛩4𝛿𝛿 > 0    .      (23.𝑎𝑎) 
So when the labour union is neutral, unionisation raises the effective employment in our model. 
In Chang et al. (2007), δ = 0; and hence the employment effect is nil in that model. Lingens 
(2003a, 2003b) and Adjemian et al. (2010) assume labour union to be neutral but show that a 
rise in its relative bargaining power reduces employment due to rise in the wage rate. Lai and 
Wang (2010) shows that unionisation raises (lowers) the employment level if and only if the 
balanced growth equilibrium is locally determinate (indeterminate).  
 Now, equation (20) shows that the balanced growth rate, g, varies positively with the 
level of effective employment. So effect of unionisation on growth rate is qualitatively similar 
to that on effective employment. This effect is given by     
          𝜕𝜕𝑔𝑔
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= �(1 − 𝜕𝜕)𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽(𝑒𝑒∗𝑒𝑒∗)𝛽𝛽−1
𝜎𝜎
�
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗𝑒𝑒∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
     .                                                                            (24) 
Sign of 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
 depends on the sign of 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
∗𝐿𝐿∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
. In Chang et al. (2007), the nature of growth effect of 
unionisation depends totally on orientation of the labour union because 𝑒𝑒 ≡ 1 there. However, 
our model incorporates ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’; and so effective employment is crucial 
rather than the employment of workers.     
 The welfare level of the representative household, ω, is obtained from equations (1), 
(17), (18) and (20); and is given by  
          𝜔𝜔 = 𝐾𝐾01−𝜎𝜎 �𝜌𝜌 + 𝜎𝜎𝑔𝑔 − 𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔𝛼𝛼 �1−𝜎𝜎1 − 𝜎𝜎 � 1𝜌𝜌 − 𝑔𝑔(1 − 𝜎𝜎)� + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎𝜃𝜃𝑑𝑑     .                                     (25) 
Equation (25) shows that welfare level varies positively with growth rate as we assume 1 > σ 
> α and ρ > g(1-σ). Hence welfare effect of unionisation is qualitatively similar to the growth 
effect of unionisation.   
 Chang et al. (2007) shows that the employment effect, growth effect and welfare effect 
of unionisation are nil when labour union is neutral. However, our model shows that these 
effects of unionisation do consist not only of membership effect but also of substitution effect; 
and, as a result, they are not nil in the presence of ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’ even if the 
union is neutral.   
 So we can establish the following proposition.   
Proposition 1: In the presence of ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’, unionisation in the labour 
market reduces the negotiated number of workers but raises the effort level when the labour 
union is neutral. As a result, effective employment is increased; and this leads to a rise in the 
growth rate and welfare level of the economy.  
 We now compare our result to the findings of existing literature. In Palokangas (1996), 
unionisation lowers employment of both unskilled labour and skilled labour in the final good 
sector due to their complementary relationship; and this results an increase in the employment 
of skilled labour in the R&D sector and therefore a rise in the growth rate. Sorensen (1997) 
shows that unionization may raise the growth rate because it raises the skill of the workers but 
lowers the profit and, in turn, the marginal return from skill accumulation. The growth rate is 
reduced (increased) in the ‘Efficient bargaining model’ (‘Right to manage model’). In 
Bräuninger (2000), unionisation, in general, lowers capital accumulation and the growth rate. 
However, in the case of heterogeneous individuals, it may raise the growth rate through 
increase in skill of workers. Lingens (2003a) uses a creative destruction growth model where 
unionisation lowers the expected profit of the innovators and employment of skilled labour in 
the manufacturing sector. This surplus labour is absorbed in the R&D sector and rate of 
innovation is raised. The net effect on growth is ambiguous and depends on the elasticity of 
substitution between the two types of labour in the manufacturing sector. Irmen and Wigger 
(2002/2003) uses an OLG model where unionisation causes a transfer of income from the 
dissaving old to the saving young; and this raises capital accumulation and growth rate. Lingens 
(2003b) develops a model of endogenous skill formation where unionisation in the unskilled 
labour market lowers the skilled unskilled relative wage and thus lowers the supply of skilled 
labour. If the long-run equilibrium level of skilled workers is low (high), then unionisation 
lowers (raises) the growth rate. Lai and Wang (2010) shows that unionisation raises (lowers) 
the growth rate if and only if the balanced growth equilibrium is locally determinate 
(indeterminate). In Adjemian et al. (2010), unionization reduces profit and thereby expected 
value of innovation; and this discourages R&D and economic growth. However, none of these 
works considers the role of efficiency wage hypothesis.   
3. The ‘Right to manage model’: 
In this section, we use the ‘Right to manage model’ of bargaining where the two parties 
bargain over the wage rate only. The firm unilaterally decides the level of employment from 
its labour demand function resulting from the profit maximising behaviour. The inverted labour 
demand function of the representative firm is given by  
         𝑤𝑤 = �𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽−1ℎ𝛽𝛽𝑏𝑏−𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿� 11−𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿       .                                                                               (26) 
So firms’ association and labour union jointly maximises the ‘generalised Nash product’ 
function given by equation (8), with respect to w only, subject to the firm’s labour demand 
function given by equation (26). Using the first order condition and equations (1), (2), (4), (5) 
and (26), optimum values of L and 𝑤𝑤 are obtained as16   
         𝑒𝑒∗∗ = (𝛽𝛽){𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}−𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛽𝛽 + 𝜕𝜕){𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}
−𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)  < 1    .            (27) 
and          𝑤𝑤∗∗ = 𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼ℎ𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1+𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿𝑒𝑒∗∗𝛽𝛽−1−𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿𝜕𝜕−𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗)𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿          ;                                             (28) 
 We assume {𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)} > 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 −
𝛽𝛽) to ensure that 𝑒𝑒∗∗ > 0.       
 From equations (1), (2), (5) and (28), we obtain the effort level per worker as given by 
         𝑒𝑒∗∗ = ℎ �𝛽𝛽
𝜕𝜕
(1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗)
𝑒𝑒∗∗
�
𝛿𝛿       .                                                                                                       (29) 
The government’s budget balance equation as well as the representative household’s behaviour 
in this model is identical to that in the ‘Efficient Bargaining’ model. So equations and solutions 
derived here are same as those obtained in section 2 except that 𝑒𝑒∗ is replaced by 𝑒𝑒∗∗ and 𝑒𝑒∗ is 
replaced by 𝑒𝑒∗∗.    
Now, from equation (27), we have 
          𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= −𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽2(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2
�
(𝛽𝛽 + 𝜕𝜕){𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}
−𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽) �2  < 0  .     (30) 
16 We assume that second order condition of maximisation is satisfied.  
                                                            
So in this model, unionisation in the labour market lowers the employment of workers 
irrespective of the orientation of the labour union.   
 Again, from equation (29), we obtain  
          𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= −𝛿𝛿ℎ �𝛽𝛽
𝜕𝜕
�
𝛿𝛿
�
(1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗)
𝑒𝑒∗∗
�
𝛿𝛿−1 1
𝑒𝑒∗∗2
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗∗
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
> 0     .                                                            (31) 
and    
          𝜕𝜕(𝑒𝑒∗∗𝑒𝑒∗∗)
𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃
= 𝑒𝑒∗∗(1 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗)(1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗) 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒∗∗𝜕𝜕𝜃𝜃         .                                                                              (32) 
Equation (31) shows that in the presence (absence) of ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’, effort 
level of a worker goes up (does not change) with unionisation in the labour market. This is 
similar to that in ‘Efficient Bargaining Model’. However, contrary to the ‘Efficient Bargaining 
Model’, equation (32) shows that the effect of unionisation on effective employment depends 
not on the orientation of the labour union but on the mathematical sign of (1 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗). If (1 − 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗) is negative (positive), then effective employment varies positively (inversely) 
with unionisation in the labour market because the number of workers varies inversely with 
unionisation. This implies that, unionisation raises (lowers) effective employment if the rate of 
unemployment, (1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗), is less (greater) than the value of wage elasticity of effort parameter, 
𝛿𝛿.   
 The intuition behind this result is as follows. Unionisation affects effective employment 
by changing both effort level and number of workers. As the first effect is positive and the 
second effect is negative, so the aggregate effect depends on the relative strength of these two 
effects. When unionisation raises wage rate and thereby the effort level of worker, the wage 
elasticity of effort parameter, 𝛿𝛿, captures the strength of this effect. However, when 
unionisation raises the number of unemployed workers, the strength of this effect is captured 
by (1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗). Hence (1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗) < 𝛿𝛿 implies that the first effect dominates the second effect.     
 This condition (1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗) < 𝛿𝛿 has important implication for policy prescription. Using 
equation (27), we find that (1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗) < 𝛿𝛿    
⇒      𝜕𝜕 < 𝜕𝜕̅ = 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝛿𝛿) �1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽){𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}�     . 
                                                                                                                                                                 (33) 
Here 𝜕𝜕̅ > 0 if               𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)[𝑚𝑚(1 − 𝛽𝛽) − 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿)] < 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)      .   
If 𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝜃𝜃, then this inequality is always valid.      
So if the tax rate is very low, then unionisation raises effective employment. The level of 
employment varies inversely with 𝜕𝜕. So a low value of 𝜕𝜕 leads to a low rate of unemployment 
such that a rise in the effort level of each worker compensates the fall in employment due to 
unionisation. So, in the presence of ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’, if the income tax rate 
charged by the government to finance unemployment benefit expenditure is very low, then 
unionisation may have a positive effect on effective employment. However, in the absence of 
‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’, i.e., when 𝛿𝛿 = 0, unionisation always lowers effective 
employment level, which is identical to the number of workers.      
Growth rate and welfare level of the economy in this model are identical to those given 
by equations (20) and (25) in efficient bargaining model except that 𝑒𝑒∗ and 𝑒𝑒∗ are replaced by 
𝑒𝑒∗∗ and 𝑒𝑒∗∗. So the effect of unionisation on growth rate and welfare level are qualitatively 
similar to its effect on effective employment. So we can conclude that unionisation raises the 
growth rate and the welfare level if 𝛿𝛿 > (1 − 𝑒𝑒∗∗). This result is different from that obtained 
in the case of the ‘Efficient bargaining model’ where effect of unionisation on growth and 
welfare depends on the nature of orientation of the labour union.    
Important results derived in this section are summarized in the following proposition.     
Proposition 2: In the ‘Right to manage model’ of bargaining, unionisation in the labour market 
raises the effort level of worker but lowers the number of workers irrespective of the orientation 
of the labour union; and raises (lowers) effective employment, balanced growth rate and 
welfare level if the wage elasticity of effort is greater (less) than the unemployment rate.   
4. Conclusion: 
This paper develops a model to investigate the effect of unionisation in the labour 
market on the long run growth rate of an economy in the presence of ‘Efficiency Wage 
Hypothesis’. Here we use two alternative versions of bargaining models – the ‘Efficient 
bargaining model’ of McDonald and Solow (1981) and the ‘Right to manage model’ of Nickell 
and Andrews (1983). The existing literature that analyses the role of unionisation on economic 
growth does not consider ‘Efficiency Wage Hypothesis’.   
 We derive different results from these two versions of bargaining models. In the 
‘Efficient Bargaining model’, unionisation in the labour market lowers the negotiated number 
of workers but raises the effort level of a worker when the labour union is neutral. Effective 
employment is increased; and this leads to an increase in the growth rate and welfare level of 
the economy. However, in the ‘Right to Manage Model’, unionisation raises the effort level of 
the worker but reduces the number of workers irrespective of the orientation of the labour 
union. This raises effective employment, balanced growth rate and welfare level of the 
economy if the wage elasticity of effort (efficiency) exceeds the unemployment rate; and this 
sufficient condition is likely to be valid when the income tax rate is very low.     
 However, our model is abstract and fails to consider many aspects of reality. We do not 
consider the possibility of human capital accumulation, population growth, technological 
progress, positive externality of public capital etc. Hence the allocation of government’s budget 
and of household’s income to education, R&D etc. is ignored in this work. For simplicity, we 
assume ‘closed shop labour union’, which is rare in reality than the more common ‘open shop 
labour union’; and thus ignore the role of membership dynamics. We plan to do further research 
in future attempting to get rid of these limitations.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A 
Derivation of optimal w and L :  
From equations (1) and (8), we obtain two first order conditions given by    
         𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑏𝑏) + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) �𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤 − 𝑒𝑒�𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾 = 0            .                                                                        (𝐴𝐴. 1) 
         𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃
𝑒𝑒
+ (1 − 𝜃𝜃) �𝛽𝛽 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒 − 𝑤𝑤�
𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾
= 0            .                                                                                     (𝐴𝐴. 2) 
From equations (A.2) and (4), we obtain   
         𝑌𝑌
𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒
= (1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃)[𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)]                   .                                                                        (𝐴𝐴. 3) 
From equations (A.1), (4) and (5), we obtain   
         𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚1 − � 𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤[1 − 𝑒𝑒]� = (1 − 𝜃𝜃) �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿
𝑌𝑌
𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒�
�(1 − 𝛼𝛼) 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 1�          .                                                                  (𝐴𝐴. 4) 
Incorporating equation (A.3) in equation (A.4), we obtain  
         𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚1 − � 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒[1 − 𝑒𝑒] (1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃)[𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)]� =
(1 − 𝜃𝜃) �1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃)[𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)]�
�
(1 − 𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃)[𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)] − 1�     . 
                                       (A.4a) 
Solving equation (A.4a), we obtain the optimal value of L as given in equation (9) in the body 
of the paper.  
Now, using equations (1) and (5), we obtain  
         𝑌𝑌 = �𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼ℎ𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿𝜕𝜕−𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿� 11+𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿          .                                                       (𝐴𝐴. 5) 
Using equations (A.3) and (A.5), we obtain     
         �𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼ℎ𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿𝜕𝜕−𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿� 11+𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿
𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒
= (1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃)[𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)]      .                
⇒    𝑤𝑤 = �𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾𝛼𝛼𝐾𝐾�1−𝛼𝛼ℎ𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽−(1+𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿)𝜕𝜕−𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿(1 − 𝑒𝑒)𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿� �[𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼) + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)](1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃) �1+𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿   .      (𝐴𝐴. 6) 
Using equations (A.6) and (9), we obtain the optimal value of w as given in equation (10) in 
the body of the paper.     
Second order conditions : 
From equations (A.1) and (A.2), we obtain  
         𝜕𝜕2𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2 𝜓𝜓 − �𝜕𝜕𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤�2
𝜓𝜓2
 
        = − 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑏𝑏)2 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃) �𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿(𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿 − 1) 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤2 (𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾) − �𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤 − 𝑒𝑒�
2
� (𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾)2       ;     (𝐴𝐴. 7) 
         𝜕𝜕2𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2 𝜓𝜓 − �𝜕𝜕𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒�2
𝜓𝜓2
 
            = −𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃
𝑒𝑒2
+ (1 − 𝜃𝜃) �𝛽𝛽(𝛽𝛽 − 1) 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒2 (𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾) − �𝛽𝛽 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒 − 𝑤𝑤�2� (𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾)2       ;                      (𝐴𝐴. 8) 
and 
         𝜕𝜕2𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝜓𝜓 − 𝜕𝜕𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 𝜕𝜕𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤
𝜓𝜓2
= �(𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 1)(𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾) − �𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤 − 𝑒𝑒� �𝛽𝛽 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒 − 𝑤𝑤�� (1 − 𝜃𝜃)−1(𝑌𝑌 − 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 − 𝑟𝑟𝐾𝐾)2   .  (𝐴𝐴. 9) 
Using equations (1), (4), (5), (9), (11), (12), (13), (14), (A.3), (A.7), (A.8), (A.9) and 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝐿𝐿
=
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0, we obtain respectively  
         𝜕𝜕2𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2
𝜓𝜓
= − (1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚)𝛩𝛩32 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿𝛩𝛩1(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿)𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚
𝑤𝑤2(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)2𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(1 − 𝜃𝜃) < 0    ;      (𝐴𝐴. 10) 
         𝜕𝜕2𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2
𝜓𝜓
= −𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛩𝛩1 + 𝛩𝛩1𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑒𝑒2 < 0       ;                                     (𝐴𝐴. 11) 
and 
         𝜕𝜕2𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤
𝜓𝜓
= [𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − 𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩2] (1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒        .                                                                          (𝐴𝐴. 12) 
Now using equations (A.10), (A.11) and (A.12), we have    
         𝜕𝜕2𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤2 𝜕𝜕2𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒2 − � 𝜕𝜕2𝜓𝜓𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤�2
𝜓𝜓2
 
                  =
�(1 − 𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚)𝛩𝛩32 + (1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿𝛩𝛩1(1 − 𝛽𝛽𝛿𝛿)𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚�{𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝛩𝛩1 + 𝛩𝛩1𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)}
−{𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 + 𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃) − 𝛩𝛩1𝛩𝛩2}2(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚  
𝑤𝑤2(1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)3𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚(1 − 𝜃𝜃)2𝑒𝑒2         .          (𝐴𝐴. 13) 
We assume that the R.H.S. of equation (A.13) is positive in order to satisfy the second order 
conditions.  
Appendix B  
Derivation of equation (15) : 
From equations (2) and (5), we obtain   
         𝑒𝑒 = ℎ �𝑤𝑤(1 − 𝑒𝑒)
𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌
�
𝛿𝛿         .                                                                                                        (𝐵𝐵. 1) 
Using equations (A.3) and (9), we obtain equation (15) in the body of the paper.   
 Derivations of section 3 are similar to that of section 2.  
